Arab Israeli War 1967

Arab Israeli War 1967IntroductionIsrael and Arabs have fought a number of contends after 1947. After the creation of Israel in 14 may 1948, Arab and Israel became front to front in 1949, 1956, and 1967 and in 1973. Among on the whole those the struggle of 5 -10 June 1967 also noted for six days warfare was the one of the major conflict. For Arabs it was the visit and for Israel it was a war of survival. The outcome of war became a smite for Arabs and victory for Israel. The entire Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and Jordanian territory west of River Jordan including capital of Israel was captured by Israel. This campaign taken as one of example in the history as fateful effects on striking to antagonist confessions through deep penetration in very short end of time. ( array command and staff collage, 2012).AimThe arrest of this presentation is to analyze the close making and brought out lesson learned from 1967 Arab Israel war.Historical BackgroundHistorically Ar abs and Jews argon sprung from the prophets Ismael and Issac both sons of prophet Abraham. oracle Ismael is believed to be the ancestor of the Arabs while Prophet Issac became the ancestor of Jews. So for both the Palestine is holy land.The creation of Israel on 14 may 1948 was the main cause betwixt Jews and Arabs conflicts. Arabs considered the creation of Israel as an fencesitter State is plot a take a leakst the people of Palestine by the Europeans and Americans.In 1956 Israel attack Egypt with the support of Britain and France to open Suez Canal. They occupied Gaza strip and large character of Sinai nevertheless left the area because of international pressure and 1967 war was taken as a sequel to these conflicts.Major factors for the 1967 conflictAfter the 1956 war there are many issues arises in this area. Arabs are looking to revenge for their loss in 1956 and for Israel it was always the survival after its creation. According to Rowman Littlefield (2000) slightly of the important factors, which contributed directly towards escalation of 1967 conflict, are as followsa. Refusal of Arabs to recognize Israel as independent state. change magnitude activities of Palestinian insurrectionists Al- FATEH against Israel.b. Withdrawal of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on 19 may 1967 that increased the already existing tension between Egypt and Israel.c. The Mutual Defense Pact signed by Egypt and Syria in 4 Nov 1966 and Jordan Egypt Defense Agreement on 30 May 1967 that strategically adventure the Israeld. Closing of Channels of Tiran that cut off the Israeli access to redness sea. On which the Israelis adjacently responded with a pre-emptive attack on June 5, 1967 that is starting of famous six-day war.Analyze the 1967 WarShort six days war of 1967 agitate the big boundary in the Middle East. After this war Israelis strategic situation had changed and they became more stronger where as the Arabs faces the humiliating loss. Different histori ans examine this war in their different way. Army command and staff collage (2012) analyzed this six days war as follows.Arabs content Aim/Objectives Arabs had zeal for themselves the aim of achieving semipolitical victory over Israel. To achieve this, they signed defense pacts among themselves and planned to give economic, political, psychological and military pressure to Israel.National outline Ever since the creation of the Israel as independent State, the Arabs national outline is the destruction of it and creation of an independent Palestine.Military Strategy The Arabs had no offence intention at the outset. Their total emphasis was on achieving a political victory and preventing Israel from going to war. Therefore, their military schema was(1) Deterrence through legions concentration helping guerrilla activity and playing the card of shell Israel, in the Arab world.(2) Force militarisation for long duration and closing of walk of Tiran, which Israel could not able to afford.(3) If war is imposed, draw in Israel to fight war on one-third fronts, all from Sinai, Jordan and Syria.Centre of Gravity Arabs identified Israel Defense forces as the burden of gravity. But they failed to notice that within these their strength lay in their mobility.Concept of mathematical operationa. War on more than two fronts to contain Israelis committed in all directions.b. Initiate actions desire forward concentration, guerrilla activities and closing of Straits of Tiran which will force Israel either to submit or attack the Arabs, which is politically advantageous for Arabs.c. If the war starts, involve Israel in long-drawn war of attrition and exploit their numerical inferiority.IsraelNational Aim/Objectives The national aim of Israel was the survival and defense of their homeland. Their strategic concept has been to avoid war but if a war is imposed they were to go for a quick and decisive war.National Strategy Israel had the national aim of ensuring the sov ereignty and territorial right of their country by employing all possible instruments of national power like military, political and diplomatic.Military Strategy Israel military objective was offensive against Arabs for defense of their homeland. Therefore there military strategy was(1) confusion Arabs both at strategic and tactical train to lure them into a false spirit of complacency.(2) Undertake a pre-emptive pushover strike to achieve complete zephyr transcendence over Sinai.(3) Undertake a pre-emptive ground offensive too.(a) bear on the war on enemy territory and seek decisive involvement on their soil.(b) Have a short and decided war destroying the Egyptian forces in Sinai.(c) If Jordan and Syria also enter the war, then capture strategic objectives of watt Bank of River Jordan and the Golan Heights.Center of Gravity Israelis rightly identified that within the three Arab countries the center of gravity laid in Egypt especially its armed forces. erst Egyptian Army Is destroyed, Syria and Jordan could never initiate an offensive on their own. They therefore dealt with the Egyptian air and ground forces first deferring Syria and Jordan for the time being.Concept of OperationEmployment of all conceivable political and psychological measures to give an depression to Arabs that Israel had been outwitted in time and space and was not in a vex to under-take a major offensive.Having completely deceived the Arabs, acquire complete air favourable position by under taking a pre-emptive air strike against Egyptian air bases followed by similar strikes against Jordanian and Syrian air bases.Appreciating that center of gravity lay with Egyptian Army in Sinai, Israelis decided to preserve a swift dislocation of Egyptian defenses by breaking-through the critical trilateral of Rafah, EI-Arish and Abu Agheila, isolate them and then carry-out destruction of the trapped enemy.Maintain signly a defensive posture against Syria and Jordan. And after secured a nd destroy the Egyptian side in the Sinai, concentrate forces against Jordan and Syria.Main Reason of Loss/Achievement of War ruin brat Perception by Arabs There are full of examples in history that whenever a nation or a commander misfortune to calculate the capabilities and intentions of the enemys he had to pay heavy price. comparable here the Arabs completely misread Israeli reactions, in- pique of there own rousing actions. They failed to perceive the inherent mobility of Israeli ground forces and went wrong in their reach that they would be able to involve Israel into a long-drawn war of attrition on their three successive defense lines which Israel couldnt manage.Strategy of Pre-emption by Israelis Fully conscious vulnerability due to lack of strategic erudition and multi-directional threat from Arab states, Israel had well prepared to use the plectrum of pre-emption. Israelis knew that it would be gruelling to destroy Arabs in full front war without taking initial in itiative. So that they use the strategy of pre-emption for which they are fully prepared.Lessons LearntThreat Perception The correct visualization of enemy was very important to gain initiative in war which the Arabs failed resulting loss in war.Surprise Surprise at strategic as well as tactical level in war is very key to achieve success. In spite of inferior in number and equipment Israeli achieve success because of there surprise not besides lies on the military but at political leadership as well.Strategy of Pre-emption Israels strategy of pre-emption adequately showed the importance of this strategy especially for a force inferior in number and equipment.Training High standard direction oriented educational activity can bring amazing results. Training is the only aspect by which one can offset the quantitative superiority of enemy as shown by Israelis in this war.Intelligence Correct intelligence information about enemy intents, capabilities and preparation has always been of paramount importance. This fact was further highlighted by these wars.Decision Theories in 1967 in WarCognitive accomplishment As crisis induced stress grows up and need of more telling termination making authority and bold leadership. When stress was low, Israelis decision makers evaluated all courses properly and made decisions for their interest. And their stress increased after closing of straits, which was perceive as a threat to their basic values. During this situation also Israels decision makers were psychologically prone to reliance on past experience, which created a greater conceptual rigidity as a guide to make out with current threats to basic values. They seemed to be acutely aware of their complex environment. Increasing stress and fatigue during this crisis did not weaken their dimension of cognitive performance. (Brecher and Geist ,1980). concentrate on immediate objectives We find that Israelis decision makers gave more attention to immediate than long-te rm objectives in this 1967 crisis. Like countering the blockade of the Straits, withdrawal of UNEF and Arabs military base up. But long-term goals and interests influenced all the decisions taken after the crisis. Brecher and Geist (1980) clustered the decisions into quin stress phases corresponding to time periods. Which are detailed in remit below.S.N. attempt var.sTime PeriodsDecisions Taken1Low Stress PhaseBefore 17 MayIssue a threat of avenging against Syria 7 MayPlace the IDF on alert 15 MayLimited mobilization 16 May2Rising Stress Phase1722 May 1967Order further mobilization of IDF reserves 17 MayInstitute large scale mobilization 19 MayShift IDF from defensive to offensive posture 19 MayAuthorize the mobilization decision 21 May3Higher Stress Phase23-27 May 1967Postpone decision on military response to Egypts massing of troops- 23 MaySend orthogonal Minister to U.S.- 23 MayWarn the U.S. that an Egyptian attack was at hand(predicate)Await Foreign Ministers repo rt on his discussions in Paris, London, and Washington- 26 May4Highest Stress Phase28 May- 4 JuneDelay pre-emptive decision again- 28 MayRenew the IDF alert- 28 MaySend manager of Counter Intelligence to U.S.- 30 MayForm a National Unity Government- 1 JuneCrystalize military plans 2 JuneLaunch pre-emptive air strike 4 June5Declining Stress PhaseAfter 4 JuneWarn Jordan against military intervention 5 JuneDelay attack on Jerusalems old(a) City 5 JuneEncircle the Old City 6 JuneEnter to Old City- 7 JuneHalt IDF enhance east of the Canal 7 JuneNot to cross Syrian parade 7 JuneDelay attack on Syria -8 JuneScale the Golan Heights 9 JuneAccept cease fire 10 June lucid Theory Rational choice theory provides decision-makers choose their best options for their interest. It tell us that when face with risk, decision makers consider the expected values and probabilities of possible outcomes and choose the option with the highest value. For Israel and Egypt, those periods were a tu rbulent period of international relations. During those times both Israel and Egypt were ceaselessly faced with risky decisions while at the brink of war. The decisions made by these two states, specifically the decisions to go to war, were sometimes unexpected and unexplainable disposed(p) current models of rational choice. (Kelly, 2008).ConclusionAlthough the 1967 Arab Israel war was limited type of war happened only for six days, it has been the favorite subjects for military historians. This war gives real throw of saying Offense is best form of Defense. This war shows how leadership, wills, motivation and training count in war in spite of technology.ReferenceArmy control and Staff Collage. (2012). Military fib Primer. Kathmandu Army Command and Staff Collage.Brecher, M., Geist, B. (1980). Decision in Crisis Israel, 1967 and 1973. Vol. 1. (Pg. 341-394). California University of California.Bregman, A. (2009). Israels Wars A History since 1947. Routledge.Howard, M., and Hun ter, R. (2012). Israel and the Arab World the Crisis of 1967. Routledge.Kelly, N. and Christopher, B. (2008). Ripe without warning Israel and Egypt 1967-1973. African Journal of Political acquirement and International Relations. Vol. 2 (1), (Pg. 013-019). Retrieved from http//www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR.Popp, R. (2006). Stumbling Decidedly into the Six- sidereal day War. MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL. Vol. 60(2), (Pg. 281-309)Remnick, D. (2007). The Seventh Day Why the Six Day War is still being fought.Sudetic, S. (2014). preemption and Israeli Decision- Making in 1967 and 1973. Routledge. Retrieved from http//www.e-ir.info/2014/03/16/pre-emption-and-israeli-decision-making-in-1967-and-1973/